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The state and 
political culture 
Julian Swann 
'Louis by the grace of God, king of France and Navarre, to all those 
who will see these letters, present and to come, greetings.' With this 
phrase French kings began the preamble to all laws issued in their 
name, and once the terms of the legislation had been expounded they 
concluded with a majestic 'for such is our pleasure'. Taken together 
these few words conjure up an enduring image of the divine right 
monarchy of the old regime. In 1614, the deputies of the third estate 
had implored the estates general to declare it a fundamental law that 
the king 'is sovereign in his state, holding his crown from God alone, 
there is no power on earth, be it spiritual or temporal which has any 
authority . . . to depose the anointed person of the king'.' Their plea 
was, in part, a response to the assassination of Henri IV and to 
memories of the terrible civil wars of the previous century. Vaunting 
the power of the crown offered hope of preventing a repetition, and, 
once the Fronde had provided another glimpse into the abyss, few 
questioned the virtues of a powerful monarchy. 
Enthusiasm for the divine right of kings dovetailed neatly with 
other theories stressing the sacred nature of monarchy. The king of 
France was no mere mortal. At his coronation he was anointed with 
oils from a phial that had, according to legend, been delivered to 
Saint RCmy by the Holy Spirit in the guise of a dove. Thereafter, like 
members of the priesthood, the king received communion in both 
' Y. M. Berck, The Birth of Absolutism: A History of France, 1598-1661 (London, 
1992),58. 
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kinds. Finally, his sacred character was underlined by an ability to 
cure by touching those afflicted with the 'king's evil', scrofula. With 
such an imposing pedigree, bishop Bossuet could, without embar- 
rassment, declare that kings 'are Gods and share in some way in 
divine independence'.' 
Sovereignty was firmly in the hands of the crown and there was no 
parliament to check royal authority. The estates general of 1614 was 
the last to meet before 1789, and the ability of French kings to govern 
without a national representative body was a defining feature of 
absolute monarchy. Not that their rule was considered tyrannical or 
arbitrary. Royal theorists were unanimous in arguing that authority 
should be exercised in accordance with divine and natural law, 
respecting the teaching of the Catholic church and the lives and 
property of the subject. The king was expected to seek counsel before 
making decisions and was restrained by the fundamental laws of the 
kingdom. Despite their imposing title, they were not embodied in any 
constitutional document and were never formally written down. 
Instead they consisted of general principles such as the inalienability 
of the royal domain, the Salic law of succession (through the direct 
male line), and, after the conversion of Henri IV in 1593, that the king 
should be a Catholic. Taken together these safeguards were enough to 
persuade the French that they lived under an absolute monarchy, not 
a tyranny or, as eighteenth-century writers usually described it, a 
despotism. 
Kmg in council 
From 1661, when Louis XIV took the momentous decision to rule as 
his own first minister, until the revolution of 1789, French kings gov- 
erned through a remarkably stable ministerial and conciliar system. 
At its apex was the conseil d'en haut, where the king weighed the great 
affairs of military and diplomatic policy with a handful of counsellors 
known as ministers of state. Attendance was by royal invitation only, 
and many with vast departmental responsibilities were never called to 
J.-B. Bossuet, Politics drawn from the very Words of Holy Scripture, ed. P. Riley 
(Cambridge, iggo), 82. 
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council, or were summoned only intermittently to lend particular 
expertise. The other great council held in the presence of the king was 
that of dispatches, which was primarily concerned with the internal 
affairs of the kingdom. In addition to the members of the conseil d'en 
haut, it included the chancellor, who was head of the judiciary, and 
the controller-general of finances. Below them were the royal council 
of finances (which the king attended), the privy council, where he was 
rarely present, and, periodically, councils of conscience and of com- 
merce. As their names suggest, these bodies dealt with more technical 
legal, fiscal, religious, and economic matters. 
Amongst the ministers of state who served Louis XIV and Louis 
XV were the respected generals d'Huxelles, Villeroy, Villars, and 
Noailles, and leading ecclesiastics including cardinals Fleury and 
Tencin. The sun king was, however, reluctant to call upon the services 
of the princes of the blood. Placing these powerful men on the coun- 
cil was fraught with danger, as they viewed the king as the first among 
equals, and they were accustomed to pursuing their own policies 
irrespective of those of the crown. Louis XIV compensated the 
princes by showing exaggerated respect for their rank within the 
social and courtly hierarchy, and by rewarding their loyalty with titles, 
pensions, gifts, and sinecures. His successors followed in his wake, 
and before 1789 there was no serious repetition of the treachery and 
rebellion of the religious wars and the Fronde. 
Alongside the ministers of state were the four secretaries of state 
(war, navy, foreign affairs, and the royal household) who, together 
with the chancellor and the controller-general of finances, dominated 
government afier 1661. The title of controller-general was given to 
Colbert after the fall of the superintendent of finances, Nicolas 
Fouquet, the principal victim of Louis XIV's decision to rule as his 
own first minister. The immense energy and prestige of Colbert 
ensured that the tentacles of the controller-general reached into the 
most remote areas of the kingdom's fiscal and administrative system. 
Yet it was an office that lacked status within the ministerial hierarchy, 
something which had serious ramifications during the eighteenth 
century when the occupants of the post changed continuously. As a 
result, the finance minister could not restrain the spending of the 
secretaries of state, nor establish the personal authority needed to 
make the administration and its personnel bend to his will. 
When it came to choosing his ministers Louis XIV was a model of 
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consistency. Those favoured came overwhelmingly from the robe 
nobility, and especially the Colbert, Le Tellier and Phklypeaux 
families. Colbert and Le Tellier had come to prominence by serving 
Mazarin, but Louis XIV allowed them to found great ministerial 
dynasties and their sons, Seignelay and Louvois, followed them 
into government. When the king died in 1715, Colbert's nephews, 
Desmaretz and Torcy, were respectively controller-general and 
secretary of state for foreign affairs. The secretary of state for the navy 
was a PhClypeaux, the count de Pontchartrain, son of the chancellor 
and controller-general of that name and the father of Maurepas. The 
latter became secretary of state in 1723 at the age of 22, and, despite 
being disgraced in 1749, allegedly for writing rude verses about 
Madame de Pompadour, he returned as Louis XVI's mentor in 1774! 
The ministerial clans engaged in fierce competition amongst them- 
selves, but Louis XIV was able to count upon their undivided loyalty 
and in a personal reign of fifty-four years he only felt it necessary to 
disgrace three ministers. During the eighteenth century, instability 
became a feature of government with ministers dismissed by the 
score. The old ministerial dynasties began to lose their grip. New 
sources of recruitment were opened up, some of which would have 
horrified Louis XIV. He had never appointed members of the Court 
aristocracy to the offices of secretary of state, hence Saint-Simon's 
famous quip that they were held by the 'vile bourgeoisie'. The 
poisoned quill of the acerbic duke was inspired by his belief that 
government ought to be the preserve of aristocrats like himself, and 
after 1715 his dreams were partially fulfilled. During the regency of 
Philippe d'OrlCans, Saint-Simon and other grandees participated in 
the polysynodie, a short-lived experiment in conciliar government. 
Its collapse in 1718 has often been attributed to the incapacity of 
the grandees. In reality, it was only a temporary setback to their 
ambitions. Louis XV was less wary of the great aristocracy than his 
predecessor. After 1750 its members were regularly appointed to the 
office of secretary of state, adding a further dimension to the faction 
fighting at Versailles, and causing friction with the robe nobility that 
had traditionally dominated ministerial office. 
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The royal Court 
The palace of Versailles was one of the most potent and enduring 
symbols of Bourbon monarchy. Louis XIV made it his principal resi- 
dence and the seat of his government in 1682, and his decision was 
long thought to be part of a cunning plan to tame the rebellious 
French aristocracy. Those that the king distrusted, such as the duke 
de La Rochefoucauld, found themselves appointed to offices that 
demanded daily attendance on his person, while the Great Condk was 
espied rowing ladies around the artificial lake. Domesticated at 
Court, they were separated from their provincial governorships and 
were unable to maintain the ties of personal loyalty and clientage that 
had been the basis of their military power. Court was also horribly 
expensive and the sums required to fuel the ostentatious lifestyle of 
a grandee potentially ruinous. When Louis XIV stepped in with 
financial gifts to soften the blow, these formerly independent 
warlords found themselves reduced to dependence. It is only neces- 
sary to recount the tales of fearsome battles amongst courtiers about 
precedence and etiquette to complete a sorry tale of an aristocracy 
trapped in a gilded cage. 
Like all good caricatures there is a grain of truth in such a portrait, 
but Versailles offered as many advantages as it did inconveniences to 
the grandees. In a rigidly hierarchical society, proximity to the king 
was worth its weight in gold, reflecting the rank and status of the 
courtier. Here lies the explanation for the many seemingly petty 
quarrels about precedence or etiquette. Even minor details were 
potentially significant, marking out the distinctions between compet- 
ing groups or families. Moreover any office or privilege that brought 
access to the monarch was coveted as a route to patronage and 
advancement with titles, offices, and sinecures providing ample 
compensation for the rather boring and menial task of waiting on 
the king. Competition was fierce and factionalism was a permanent 
feature of Court life, with cabals forming in the hope of capturing 
the king's ear and of monopolizing the patronage at his disposal. The 
ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin offered perfect illustrations of 
what could happen when a favourite ruled in the king's stead, and 
both had used their position to amass colossal fortunes, while ruling 
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through an administration staffed by their 'creatures'. So absolute 
was their authority that other courtiers, including Louis XIII's 
mother, Marie de Medici, his brother, Gaston d'OrlCans, and the 
prince de Conde were driven to revolt. 
There would be no repeat of such behaviour during the personal 
reign of Louis XIV and the sun king was at his most masterful when it 
came to managing the Court. He cultivated an image of Olympian 
detachment by scrupulously protecting the respective ranks and dig- 
nities of the grandees. He was no less attentive to their incessant 
claims and counter-claims for patronage, realizing that the balanced 
distribution of his favour was the key to harmony. Finally, he 
rewarded the loyalty of his aristocracy by appointing its members 
to the highest positions in church and state as bishops, generals, 
diplomats, and court officials. 
Versailles was, therefore, part of a royal strategy that reinforced the 
prestige of the most powerful families in the kingdom, more than 
making up for any loss of influence in the provinces. Louis XIV used 
every nuance of Court life to his advantage, but neither of his succes- 
sors had his masterful touch. Whereas the sun king had been care- 
ful to keep the grandees satisfied with honours and commands 
appropriate to their station, Louis XV chose aristocrats such as the 
dukes de Choiseul, Praslin, and d'Aiguillon as his secretaries of state. 
Winning control of the ministry became one of the principal goals of 
the Court cabals and the bitterness of their rivalries undoubtedly 
contributed to the political instability that preceded the revolution. 
Louis XVI, on the other hand, was unable to preserve an image of 
impartiality. The queen, Marie-Antoinette, gradually gained control 
over both ministerial appointments and patronage, attracting vicious 
criticism from those excluded from her charmed circle in the 
process. 
Despite the effectiveness of Versailles in projecting the image and 
authority of the monarchy, it was not without cost. By withdrawing 
to the great palace and to others dotted around Paris, successive 
kings cut themselves off from their subjects, and from an older 
tradition of monarchy built upon regular public display. This was 
particularly damaging during the eighteenth century when neither 
Louis XV nor Louis XVI made more than a handful of sorties beyond 
the fle-de-France. They thus failed to cultivate public affection, or to 
imitate monarchs such as Frederick I1 of Prussia or George I11 of 
THE STATE AND POLITICAL CULTURE 1 145 
Great Britain who were so adept at associating themselves with the 
lives and patriotism of their subjects. 
State and administration 
Although absolute in theory, the power of French kings was much 
more limited in practice. France had no common legal code or 
administrative system, many of its people spoke languages other than 
French, and individuals, towns, corporations, and provinces all pos- 
sessed a bewildering array of privileges. Before 1789, the kingdom was 
divided into the historic provinces that had been added piecemeal to 
the crown over the centuries. Dynastic accidents had led to the acqui- 
sition of Burgundy and Brittany, in 1476 and 1532 respectively; Louis 
XIV conquered Franche-ComtC in 1678; and Lorraine did not become 
part of France until 1766. When they inherited or captured a prov- 
ince, or even a town, monarchs recognized their existing privileges. 
These rights were guarded jealously, and one of the most predictable 
sights of a new reign was the procession of local worthies petitioning 
the king for their confirmation. 
Provinces were divided between the pays d'dtats, such as Artois, 
Brittany, Burgundy and Languedoc, which had preserved the right to 
assemble the local estates, and the pays d'dlection where that privilege 
had lapsed. Royal authority in the provinces was represented by the 
governor, who was usually a prince of the blood or a great aristocrat. 
Before 1660, an able governor could rule as a minor potentate, using 
his prestige and patronage to win the personal allegiance of local 
nobles and office-holders. CondC and the other frondeur princes had 
used their governorships as recruiting grounds for their campaigns 
against Mazarin. The political finesse of Louis XIV, who kept the 
princes at Court rather than in the provinces, and the growing 
strength of the royal army gradually rendered noble revolts obsolete, 
but the governors remained important. Many civil and military 
appointments were in their personal gift, and their rank and proxim- 
ity to the king made them highly attractive as power-brokers for 
provincials seeking the favour of the government. 
A governorship was a lucrative and prestigious position, but it was 
not a sinecure. In moments of crisis, the incumbent was expected to 
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come to the aid of the province. When the terrible winter of 1709 
threatened Lyon with famine, the governor, Villeroy, sent troops to 
secure grain from neighbouring Burgundy. His actions produced a 
clash with the governor of that province, the prince de Condt, who 
on several occasions made plain his refusal 'to see Burgundians 
starve to feed Ly~n ' .~  Burgundy was a Condi family fief, and in 
1775 his successor came to the aid of Dijon, arguing furiously with 
the controller-general, Turgot, whose doctrinaire pursuit of free 
trade in grain had caused hardship and unrest in the city. In more 
prosperous times, the governors contributed to the embellishment 
of the artistic, cultural, and economic life of the provinces, spon- 
soring public buildings, learned academies, and new industrial 
ventures. 
In theory, the crown had thousands of office-holders to carry out 
its business, including, among others, the members of the parle- 
ments, courts of aids, chambers of accounts, bureaux of finances, 
and the grand council. In addition to acting as the highest courts of 
appeal within their jurisdictions, the parlements traditionally policed 
public order, watched over the supply of essentials such as bread and 
firewood and supervised the administration of prisons and hospitals. 
The courts of aids heard appeals against tax assessments and investi- 
gated abuse in the fiscal system, especially relative to the taille, while 
the chambers of accounts verified the accounts of tax-collecting 
bodies such as the provincial estates or bureaux of finances. The 
grand council, on the other hand, was a tribunal for the adjudication 
of disputes within the legal system, especially those involving the 
parlements or between a parlement and the lower presidia1 courts. 
It also heard certain privileged cases such as those affecting the 
religious orders. 
On paper, the king possessed an impressive officialdom, but it 
should not be confused with a modern bureaucracy. Since the six- 
teenth century, French monarchs had sold judicial and administrative 
offices to the highest bidder, and in return for an annual payment 
allowed office-holders to pass on their charge to their descendants or 
sell them on. To make them attractive, offices came complete with 
privileges, including hereditary nobility for the most exalted, and 
membership of a corporate body. This system, known as venality, was 
' Archives Dipartementales de la CBte d'Or, C 3144, fos. 298-g. 
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a lucrative source of income for the crown, and it was a boon to the 
upwardly mobile. The great ministerial dynasties, and many of the 
most dynamic servants of the Bourbon monarchy, acquired nobility 
through the purchase of office. 
There was, however, a price to pay. The only means of removing 
the office-holders was through reimbursement and the chronic state 
of the royal finances prevented even Colbert from achieving that aim. 
As a result, the government was obliged to work with these powerful 
corps, whose recruitment was beyond its control and which were 
frequently more concerned with their own, or provincial, interests, 
than those of the king. Even when such clashes were avoided, often 
large assemblies of office-holders were difficult to manage, and they 
were ill-suited to providing the rapid decision-making and unbiased 
local information that the government needed. It was, in part, to 
circumvent these problems that the crown became increasingly 
attracted to the solution offered by the intendants. 
The period from 1660 to the revolution was the golden age of the 
intendants, who were commissioners appointed by the king. They 
were sent to one of the fiscal and administrative regions known as 
generalities to act in matters pertaining to 'justice, police and 
finance'. As the boundaries of generalities roughly coincided with 
those of the provinces, intendants had often been the clients of gov- 
ernors and even after 1661 it was advisable for them to tread carefully. 
In 1694, D'Argouges, intendant of Burgundy, made the fatal mistake 
of crossing the Condd family and was recalled. Long afterwards his 
successors trembled at the mention of the governor. Elsewhere their 
more fortunate colleagues were able to take advantage of the wide- 
ranging nature of their commissions to become the driving force of 
provincial administration. 
The majority of intendants were recruited from the ranks of the 
robe nobility. A typical candidate had been educated in the law before 
passing a brief spell in one of the parlements. From there he bought 
the office of master of requests, acting as the king's judge and report- 
ing to the royal council, where he could hope to impress a patron 
ready to open the doors of an intendance. Once in place, the intend- 
ants faced a truly daunting task. First they were expected to act as the 
eyes and ears of the government, and Colbert and his successors 
expected an almost daily flow of information. Even the most cursory 
glance through the voluminous correspondence they generated 
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reveals that the duty was performed conscientiously. Official files 
overflow with reports on, for example, the state of the harvest, the 
condition of the highways, and the behaviour of provincial institu- 
tions and their members. Fiscal matters were, however, uppermost in 
the minds of the intendants. They were expected to draw up the rolls 
of the taille, and later those of the new direct taxes-the capitation, 
tenth, and the twentieth-and oversee their collection. Keeping 
abreast of this crucial task obliged them to make regular tours of their 
generality, and the ideal intendant was a peripatetic beast. Knowledge 
of local terrain helped reduce fraud and evasion, kept local officials 
on their toes, and provided the basis of the reports despatched to 
Versailles. 
The intendants were also burdened with a variety of other duties. 
They supervised the raising of the militia regiments, implemented 
commercial schemes, inspected fairs and markets, and settled local 
judicial disputes. Many other tasks could be added to this list, and it is 
not surprising that they acquired a reputation for omnipotence. Dur- 
ing the seventeenth century, men such as Pellot, intendant of Poitou, 
Bouchu, intendant of Burgundy, or Basville, in Languedoc, laboured 
away for decades as trusted servants of the crown, while in the next 
century their successors such as Turgot or Bertier de Sauvigny, 
respectively intendants of Limoges and the generality of Paris, were 
amongst the most enlightened administrators of their age. That these 
later examples are drawn from the pays d'tlections was not a coinci- 
dence. It was there that the intendants had the greatest freedom to act 
upon their own initiative. In the pays d'e'tats, on the other hand, a 
strong tradition of local self-government reduced their authority 
considerably. 
To deal with such an imposing workload, the intendants were 
forced to recruit local deputies called subdelegates, to assist them. 
Colbert fiowned on the practice] but by 1700 they had become part of 
the administrative furniture, and at the end of the old regime the 
thirty-three intendants were served by over 700 subdelegates. Yet 
these were hardly imposing numbers when we consider both the 
physical size of the kingdom and its burgeoning population of some 
28 million. Without denigrating their immense efforts, it is clear that 
the intendants were also restrained by social and political realities. 
Mostly recruited from the narrow circle of the Parisian robe nobility, 
they were frequently the clients of ministers. Moreover despite official 
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regulations stipulating that intendants should not spend more than 
three years in one generality, or be sent to their own regions, these 
rules were regularly flouted. Even when the intendant had no per- 
sonal connections in the province where he served, maintaining the 
guise of an inflexible agent of the central government was likely to 
prove counter-productive. If he antagonized local elites, he risked 
provoking not only opposition to his policies, but also a flood of 
angry correspondence to his masters in Versailles. To thrive, an 
intendant needed to cultivate support by showing a willingness to 
listen to the local population and, where appropriate, to intervene 
with the government on its behalf. Problems with raising the militia 
or arrears in taxation were commonly explained away by the poverty 
of the region, or the paucity of the harvest, and ministers were always 
on the lookout for evidence that an intendant was 'going native' and 
neglecting his primary duty of serving the king. 
Within the pays d'dtats, the power of the intendant was more 
restricted. Together with the governor, he represented the king at the 
assemblies of the provincial estates, presenting the royal demands to 
the deputies of the three orders. The estates had preserved the right of 
consent to taxation, and the most pressing problem was to secure the 
necessary approval for a 'free gift' (don gratuit), and, after 1695, the 
capitation and other direct taxation. 
Traditionally the voting of monies was a protracted business, often 
strung out over weeks, with the governor and intendant obliged to 
use all of the charm, patronage, and threats at their disposal in order 
to produce an offer acceptable to the king. Louis XIV found the 
practice of haggling with his subjects demeaning, and by the late 
1670s he had effectively ended it. When the provincial estates met, 
they no longer engaged in a lengthy ritual of offering the smallest free 
gift compatible with decency and then gradually increasing it until 
compromise was reached. Instead, they accorded the full amount 
requested by the king by acclamation. This was not the result of Louis 
XIV's threats, or the despotic nature of 'absolutism'. When the estates 
showed respect and obedience, the king rewarded them by reducing 
his demands. The monarch thus received the outward signs of sub- 
mission that he craved, while the estates had a real incentive to com- 
ply. With the periodic exception of Brittany, this model of mutually 
beneficial cooperation endured without significant modification 
until 1787. 
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Provincial estates which continued to meet were, therefore, power- 
ful and independent institutions. When they were not assembled, 
they delegated their authority to permanent commissions, and these 
bodies, not the intendants, carried out the vast majority of fiscal and 
administrative tasks. The intendants were forced to work with the 
commissions, and their role involved more supervision and negoti- 
ation than in the pays d'dlection. Despite these qualifications, the 
intendants were impressive royal servants, and they did achieve a 
remarkable amount given the obstacles they faced. They offered a first 
taste of uniform government in the sense that every generality had an 
intendant from 1689, when Brittany finally fell into line with the rest 
of the kingdom. 
Although the intendants have captured the historiographical head- 
lines, there were others toiling away in important, if less glamorous, 
administrative posts. Secretaries of state and controllers-general came 
and went, but their teams of clerks (commis) remained in place. First 
clerks such as Malet, Mesnard de Conichard, or Marie de Villiers were 
amongst the most prestigious of several hundred who laboured for 
the ministry, and they were probably the inspiration for the econo- 
mist Gournay when he coined the term bureaucracy in the middle of 
the eighteenth century. These were not venal appointments, and tal- 
ent and technical expertise as well as the pamge 'of  a minister were 
essential ingredients in a successful career. Not surprisingly, many 
clerks stayed in their posts throughout the revolutionary and Napo- 
leonic periods, providing the backbone of the state. Similar patterns 
are detectable amongst both the engineers of bridges and roads, who 
were responsible for the impressive expansion of the road network 
during the eighteenth century, and the inspectors of manufactures. 
Entrance to these posts was increasingly by competitive examination, 
and proven competence and professionalism were required for 
advancement. The old regime state was therefore an uneasy amalgam 
of traditional and more modern forms of administration which were 
frequently in competition with one another. 
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The fiscal military state 
From 1660 until the Revolution only one decade, that of the ipos, 
was entirely peaceful, and the French state had been forged by the 
demands of war. The great conflicts of Louis XIV's reign saw the 
kingdom fighting desperately against ever more powerful coalitions. 
To do so required mobilization of men and materials on a hitherto 
unseen scale. During the Thirty Years War, the rival armies often 
resembled little more than mercenary bands, and to put 50,000 
troops in the field was a major achievement. Thanks to the painstak- 
ing work of the secretaries of state, Le Tellier and his son Louvois, the 
situation was transformed. Rigorous attention to the perennial prob- 
lems of arming, housing, and feeding troops allowed ever larger 
forces to be raised, and, more importantly, to be kept on a war footing 
even in peacetime. In what might justifiably be called a military revo- 
lution, the army rose to a staggering 360,000 by the early eighteenth 
century. No less remarkable was the growth of the navy, which, at 
its peak in the 1680s, briefly challenged the maritime hegemony of 
England and the Dutch republic. The cost of these forces and the 
campaigns they waged was astronomical, and by the end of the War 
of the Spanish Succession in 1713 France was in debt to the tune of 
2,000 million livres. Although the size of the army declined to a 
peacetime level of 160,ooo by the reign of Louis XVI, war was no less 
expensive and the bill for the War of American Independence alone 
amounted to over 1,000 million livres. 
The means by which the monarchy raised the revenue for these 
campaigns says much about the nature of the old regime and the 
reasons for its eventual demise. The taille, which was paid by the 
third estate, and especially the peasantry, was the principal direct tax. 
In the course of the century after 1690, direct taxation was extended 
to include all lay members of French society. In 1695, the introduction 
of the capitation marked the end of noble fiscal exemption, and it was 
followed by the tenth (1710-17, 1733-6, 1740-8) and its successor the 
twentieth (1749-89). Only the Catholic church was able to preserve its 
independence, and continued to vote its own 'free gift' to the king. 
In the pays d'tlection, it was the intendants who drew up the tax 
rolls and oversaw the fiscal administration, but in the pays d'ttats that 
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task fell to the permanent commissions of the provincial estates. 
Within individual parishes, it was the peasants who organized the 
collection of the tax and they were held jointly responsible for pro- 
ducing their allocation. If anyone absconded, or refused to pay, it was 
left to their fellow parishioners to make up the difference. These sums 
passed to local receivers, who had bought their office from either the 
crown or the provincial estates. They had done so in pursuit of profit, 
and in addition to their fees substantial sums stuck to their fingers 
and to those of the receivers-general who oversaw their activities for 
the generality as a whole. Nor was the royal treasury,filled with public 
servants. Those funds that were not consumed at a local level flowed 
into central funds (caisses) that were themselves controlled by office- 
holders acting in their own interest as well as that of the king. This 
intermingling of public and private motives was even more blatant 
in the field of indirect taxation. The crown leased the collection 
of customs and excise duties to syndicates of tax farmers, who paid 
a cash advance and often an interest free loan as security to the 
king. Naturally enough, they had a vested interest in extracting the 
maximum from taxation because every penny they received over and 
above that paid for the l e ' a sms  profit. 
Tax revenues were rarely sufficient in themselves to cover royal 
expenditure, and the government was obliged to borrow heavily to 
meet its engagements. After 1688, it became increasingly clear to 
French statesmen that they were at a financial disadvantage relative 
to the Dutch and the English, who could float loans far more cheaply. 
The absence of a national parliament, and its own justly deserved 
reputation for sharp practice, account for the monarchy's discomfort. 
It did, however, compensate partially through a ruthless exploitation 
of both venality and the wider system of privilege. Between 1689 and 
1713, new offices were created in profusion, encompassing every pro- 
fession from judge to that of taster of spirituous liquors, Nor was the 
sale of office the only way funds could be extracted from venality. 
Once a profession had been venalized, it was relatively easy to extort 
fresh funds from its members by threatening to create new offices, or 
to reduce its privileges. Both policies threatened to undercut the 
market price of existing offices, and to protect their patrimonies 
the endangered owners proposed cash gifts for the withdrawal, or 
moderation of the crown's demands. If their appeal was granted, they 
would then borrow privately using their collective prestige, salaries, 
THE STATE AND POLITICAL CULTURE ( 153 
and privileges as collateral. As the king usually thanked them for their 
public-spiritedness by graciously confirming those rights, they had 
the security required to borrow at comparatively low rates of interest. 
It is easy to imagine how unpopular these measures were, and they 
were not helped by their method of implementation. Private traitants 
paid for the right to sell offices much as farmers-general leased the 
right to collect taxation. Not surprisingly, they were adept at finding 
new areas to venalize, or in suggesting existing corps that might be 
squeezed further, and they were consequently detested. 
Through its fiscal expediency, the monarchy reinforced the system 
of venality and privilege that it had created. Historians have often 
wondered why, for example, the pays d'dtats survived after 1661, and 
the answer is to be found, in part, in their ability to raise credit. They 
were continually obliged to advance money to the crown in order to 
'buy out' unwanted offices, or deflect royal interference in their 
affairs. This was a provincial variation on the general theme of the 
royal extortion of corporate bodies. During the eighteenth century, 
however, the system was extended with the king ordering the provin- 
cial estates to borrow on his behalf. Using their far superior credit, 
they were able to raise funds at only 4 or 5 per cent, receiving in 
return a portion of the receipts from the capitation or twentieth with 
which to pay the interest and amortize the capital. For the estates and 
their creditors it was almost too good to be true. They were being 
offered a regular and secure investment opportunity which they 
seized with alacrity. Provincial estates also profited from royal penury 
by negotiating what were termed abonnements for the capitation and 
twentieths. In return for a cash advance to the crown, that was usually 
much inferior to the actual value of a particular tax, they received the 
right to levy it themselves. As the estates were controlled by urban 
office-holding and noble elites, the fiscal burden was then deflected 
onto the peasantry. 
By milking the system of venality and privilege the monarchy 
raised billions, but by reinforcing the power of the office-holders and 
alienating its taxes to the pampered elites of the towns and the pays 
d'e'tats, it made necessary reform even harder to achieve. Moreover 
the use of extortion and fiscal blackmail to raise funds had its costs, 
confirming the government's reputation for bad faith-the very 
reason why the public was reluctant to lend to it in the first place! 
That such a ramshackle fiscal system did not collapse before 1788 is a 
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tribute both to the monarchy's resourcefulness and to the patience 
and resilience of its subjects. But the relative decline of France as a 
military power after 1750, and the initial outbreak of revolution in 
1789, had fiscal origins. 
The critics of state power 
If historians are today more conscious of the limits of royal power, 
contemporaries nevertheless feared the strength of Louis XIV's state. 
As memories of the Fronde receded and wars took their toll, critical 
voices were once again heard. Some came from predictable sources, 
notably the Huguenot victims of religious persecution. In a fiery 
pamphlet, The Sighs of France Enslaved, the exiled Calvinist pastor, 
Pierre Jurieu, accused Louis XIV of acting tyrannically not only by 
persecuting his Protestant~ubjects, but also by stripping the nobility, 
towns, and provinces of their liberties. Similar conclusions were 
reached by Fenelon, tutor to Louis XIV's grandson, the duke de 
Burgundy, and his fellow dukes, Chevreuse and Beauvillier. They 
formed a Court-in-waiting, and as Louis XIV's reign dragged on they 
busied themselves with plans for reform. They lamented the loss of 
representative institutions, and planned to reintroduce provincial 
estates into the pays d'e'lection, to abolish the intendants and even to 
call an estates general. Another target of their ire was the centraliza- 
tion of the royal administration, and its alleged secrecy and lack of 
accountability. Criticizing the king directly was clearly not advisable, 
and it was the secretaries of state who bore the brunt of the attack, 
being charged with the crime of 'ministerial despotism'. 
What united critics of Louis XIV was the belief that French gov- 
ernment had become arbitrary, authoritarian, and unrepresentative. 
These dissident voices were largely confined to the ranks of the exiled 
Huguenots or to aristocratic salons before 1715, but in the course of 
the eighteenth century criticism began to seep into the public 
domain. The parlements were particularly important to this process, 
repeating the attacks on ministerial despotism and the arbitrary and 
inefficient nature of the royal administration in their many remon- 
strances. These texts were published and widely disseminated 
amongst the literate public, and, after 1750, they were accompanied by 
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a wider debate about the desirability of reviving provincial represen- 
tative institutions. In private, some radical spirits dreamed of a 
restored estates general, and the first public calls for such an assembly 
were heard by the end of the reign of Louis XV. 
Given the traditional image of absolute monarchy, it seems 
incongruous that such ideas should have been circulating throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yet both contemporaries 
and many subsequent historians were dazzled by the first twenty 
years of Louis XIV's personal reign, assuming that the monarchy 
was indeed as powerful as the theorists and propagandists claimed. 
In fact, the years between 1660 and 1685 were something of an 
aberration, a brief period of calm in an otherwise choppy sea. 
The parlements 
While the existence of dissident voices should never be ignored, the 
French monarchy was nevertheless viewed by the majority of its 
subjects not as a despotism, but as a government tempered by the 
laws. In addition to the moderating influence of the Catholic church, 
they took comfort in the existence of corporate bodies that restrained 
the crown. The most significant of these were the parlements. The 
parlement of Paris was the highest court of appeal in a vast jurisdic- 
tion covering approximately one-third of the kingdom. By 1789, 
there were also twelve provincial parlements, sitting in cities such 
as Aix-en-Provence, Bordeaux, Grenoble, and Rouen. Judges in the 
parlements were venal office-holders who had, in many cases, 
invested fabulous sums for the privilege of belonging to one of these 
august institutions. In terms of prestige, the parlement of Paris was at 
the apex of the judicial system, and the dignity of its members was 
reinforced by their association with the princes of the blood and the 
peers who participated in their assemblies on great public occasions. 
Parlements were not representative institutions, but nor were they 
mere law courts. Whenever the monarch issued new, or revised, 
legislation, including that affecting fiscal matters, it was sent to the 
parlements for registration. The judges then examined the law to 
ensure that there were no conflicts with existing jurisprudence. 
Where they found none, the law was added to the court's registers 
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and was published and enforced by its officers. If, on the other hand, 
they found grounds for an objection, they could delay its implemen- 
tation while they petitioned the sovereign with remonstrances. On 
certain contentious subjects, notably their own privileges, taxation, or 
religious affairs, the judges often repeated this process several times 
before registration. Should the king wish to accelerate matters, or to 
end an unseemly squabble, he could command obedience at a 'bed of 
justice'. In Paris, this quaintly named ceremony was attended by the 
king in person, together with the princes, peers, and great officers of 
the crown, while in the provinces it was the governor who presided. 
The disputed legislation was presented by the chancellor who, after 
listening to a justification of the parlement's resistance from its first 
president, made a tour of the assembly, before approaching the king 
and declaring the law registered. It was an elaborate charade which, 
through the performance of ritual, disguised the imposition of the 
royal will. 
If the crown was patient, however, and allowed the judges to delib- 
erate and even remonstrate where necessary, it could usually count 
upon achieving prompt registration. By submitting laws to the scru- 
tiny of the parlements, it also gained significantly in the process. 
While there was theoretically nothing to stop the king from issuing 
laws as arrtts du conseil, he rarely did so because contemporaries 
were almost unanimous in believing that registration conferred a 
solemnity and authority that laws would otherwise lack. Despite the 
frustration of both Louis XV and Louis XVI with the obstruc- 
tionism of the parlements, the monarchy enjoyed a symbiotic rela- 
tionship with these great law courts, and without them would, in all 
probability, have faced a rendezvous with the estates general before 
1789- 
It is true that in 1673, Louis XIV curtailed the power of the 
parlements by obliging them to register laws before presenting 
remonstrances. His decision horrified former frondeurs like Jean Le 
Boindre, who wrote that as 'the French had changed their laws and 
their monarchy, they might as well change their name'.4 He was 
obliged to brood in silence, and despite his anger we should note 
that the king never challenged the legitimacy of either registration 
in the parlement or remonstrances. Over the period as a whole, the 
J. Le Boindre, Dtbats du parlement de Paris pendant la rninoritt! de Louis XIV, ed. 
R. Descimon and 0. Ranum (Paris, i997), 355. 
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relationship between the crown and its judges produced more debate 
and conflict than might be expected within a theoretically absolute 
monarchy. Without ever being revolutionary, the parlements 
expounded a set of legal principles which, while not incompatible 
with royal sovereignty, acted as a brake on its exercise. Central to their 
claims was the right to 'free verification' of the law. If, for example, 
the king refused to hear remonstrances, arrested or exiled judges, 
tried to cut short parlementary assemblies or held a bed of justice, he 
was almost certain to provoke an angry response. Bound together by 
their esprit de corps the judges were tenacious opponents. They were 
most easily roused in defence of their own honour and jurisdiction, 
quarrelling with rival law courts, the clergy, and any other institution 
brave enough to risk their wrath. Self-interest played a significant 
part in their thinking, especially on fiscal matters, but it was not their 
sole motivation. They did have a wider conception of their role 
which included the presentation of public grievances. As the parle- 
ment of Paris noted in 1718, in the absence of the estates general, 'your 
Parlement, sire . . . is the only channel by which the voice of your 
people can reach 
Those who were anxious to see an institutional check on the 
powers of the crown were happy to concur, overlooking the venal 
nature of the parlements to accord them a representative role. This 
was most apparent in the case of the parlement of Paris which was 
not only presented as a substitute for the estates general, but even 
as the true parliament of France. This argument first surfaced 
during the Fronde in a controversial pamphlet entitled the Judicium 
Francorum, which gave a novel twist to radical theories first advanced 
during the sixteenth-century religious wars. Whereas Huguenot 
resistance theorists had argued that the estates general was the des- 
cendant of ancient French parliaments that had met in the age of the 
Franks and the Gauls, the author of the Judiciurn Francorurn claimed 
that the parlement of Paris was that true parliament of the kingdom. 
During the personal reign of Louis XIV any supporters of this theory 
kept their thoughts to themselves. In 1732, however, the Judicium 
Francorum was dusted off and reprinted by Jansenist lawyers 
anxious for support in their campaign against the religious policies of 
cardinal de Fleury. The parlement reacted angrily, ordering the 
J. Flammermont, Les Remontrances du parlement de Paris au xviii' silcle (3 vols., 
Paris, 1888-98), i. 101. 
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pamphlet to be lacerated and burnt by the public executioner. Yet 
when the religious troubles flared again during the i75os, the ideas 
contained within the Judicium Francorum were popularized in a 
more substantial work, the Lettres historiques of 1753-4, written by the 
Jansenist lawyer, Louis-Adrien Le Paige. Within months, his theories 
had been integrated into the remonstrances of the parlement which, 
in August 1756, boldly declared that it had an unbroken 1,600-year 
history dating back to the 'birth of the French rnonar~hy'.~ 
To bolster these fanciful claims, the Parisian judges reached out to 
their colleagues in the provinces by declaring their affiliation to the 
mother parlement in Paris. Rather than forming separate institutions, 
the provincial courts were 'classes' of the one and indivisible national 
body. Having conjured up a national parlement, it was but one small 
step to transform it into a parliament by challenging the ritual of a 
bed of justice. In 1756, Le Paige published a pamphlet which took his 
theories to their logical conclusion by claiming that those present had 
the right to give their opinions openly, and not, as was currently 
practised, sit silently while the chancellor counted their imaginary 
votes. If one believed that the parlement of Paris really was the 
successor to the Frankish assemblies, it was difficult to find fault with 
his argument. Unfortunately, as many were well aware, the origins of 
the parlement were to be found in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, not at the side of Clovis or Charlemagne. 
Yet whether they shared Le Paige's historical vision or not, many 
judges were prepared to endorse aspects of it because he confirmed 
their belief that the parlement held a special place amongst the king- 
dom's institutions. Montesquieu had already popularized the notion 
of the parlements as intermediary powers, ensuring that France 
was a monarchy and not a despotism, and the judges themselves 
were forever reminding the king that they were the guardians of the 
'fundamental laws'. Indeed so insistent were their references to the 
latter, that Louis XV once asked chancellor de Lamoignon what they 
meant. With understandable embarrassment, he was forced to admit 
that he was unsure. Lamoignon had no need to reproach himself. 
For the parlement, the beauty of such concepts lay in their very 
vagueness. Quarrels with rival corps, or even the crown, could 
acquire a whole new dimension by being invested with the gravitas of 
Flammermont, Remontrances, ii. 26,73. 
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a defence of the fundamental laws. Many of the constitutional argu- 
ments advanced by the judges during times of conflict were therefore 
rhetorical strategies, intended to achieve more limited objectives than 
their evocative language suggests. As part of a privileged professional 
and social elite, they were instinctively conservative and with very few 
exceptions devoutly monarchist. It was, however, frequently a more 
legalistic and restricted conception of monarchy than that held by the 
Bourbon kings and their ministers. 
Because of its symbolic and political importance and proximity to 
Versailles, the parlement of Paris was regularly drawn into the high 
political world of the Court. Its deliberations during the Fronde, for 
example, were nearly always graced by the presence of princes of the 
blood, or members of the peerage. They realized that the parlement 
gave legitimacy to their opposition to the regency government. Louis 
XIV was determined to avoid a repetition of such behaviour. He 
worked assiduously to confine the judges to their legal duties, and 
tried to limit their contacts with Versailles by forbidding them from 
sitting on the councils of the princes. 
When the parlement was once again permitted to remonstrate 
before registration in 1715, its political power was restored and the 
barriers separating it from Versailles fell into disrepair. By cementing 
links of faction and clientage with the judges, ministers and courtiers 
could hope to influence their deliberations. If the parlement 
obstructed legislation, the credit of a minister could be challenged 
and he might even be disgraced, thus creating an opening for those 
who had plotted his fall. Predictably it was the controller-general who 
was most vulnerable, and attempts to introduce new taxation or 
reform the fiscal system were, from his perspective, fraught with 
danger. 
Within the parlement similar calculations were also being made. 
The great robe dynasties of, for example, Joly de Fleury, Lamoignon, 
Maupeou, Mold, and d'ormesson competed for the highest judicial 
offices of chancellor, first president, and procurator-general. Their 
rivalries and jealousies continually affected the behaviour of the par- 
lement. When Lamoignon de Blancmesnil became chancellor in 1750, 
his defeated rival, first president de Maupeou, was accused, not with- 
out some justification, of encouraging opposition in the court to 
embarrass his new superior. After 1768, when Maupeou's son was 
named chancellor, he quickly discovered that he had bitter critics 
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amongst the other robe clans that resented his good fortune. The 
willingness of Louis XV to choose his controller-general directly from 
the benches of the parlement, as occurred in 1763 and 1769, stoked the 
flames of internal rivalries yet further, because there was no shortage 
of would-be candidates for such a powerful post. 
Finally, after 1750, the parlement of Paris sought to draw the 
princes and the peers into its disputes with both the clergy and the 
crown. The judges issued invitations to participate in their deliber- 
ations in, for example, 1752,1756,1760, and 1766, which were quickly 
countermanded by an angry Louis XV. His action infuriated the 
grandees, many of whom were encouraging the parlement and 
hoping to exercise a more direct role in its affairs. The king's dis- 
comfiture provided a perfect illustration of how the tight political 
control exercised by the sun king had been allowed to lapse. As Louis 
XVI stumbled through the pre-revolutionary crisis of 1787-8, it was a 
dangerous combination of princes, parlements, and people that 
would prove his undoing. 
Corporate politics 
In the hierarchical and corporate society of the old regime, the 
monarch reigned supreme. It was he who created and confirmed 
the rights, distinctions, and privileges of his subjects, and acted as the 
arbiter of their claims and disputes. Arguing about who should take 
the lead in a procession, dress in a particular fashion, or be allowed to 
sit, on what, and in the company of whom, are just a selection of the 
myriad disputes that were a daily feature of life in France before 1789. 
One of the most notorious quarrels involved the dukes and peers and 
the presidents of the parlement of Paris. The affair hinged on whether 
or not the presidents should remove their bonnets in the presence of 
the peers. Despite its seemingly superficial nature, this was a crucial 
issue as it would seal the respective positions of the disputants in the 
social hierarchy. As for the parlement of Dijon, it spent several 
months in exile for refusing to allow the local military commandant 
to sit in the governor's armchair. It prompted one Burgundian wit to 
note that, just as much passes between 'the glass and the nose', so too 
does it 'between the arse and the armchair' (entre les fesses et Ie 
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fauteuil).' In the world of the law, jurisdiction was a perennial cause 
of contestation. The parlements and the church were continually 
at loggerheads about appeals, when secular courts overturned the 
verdicts of their spiritual counterparts (appels comrne d'abus). They 
were not alone. Protecting honour and status was an obsession at 
every level of society, and corps of wigmakers or winemakers were no 
less anxious to uphold their dignity and precedence than the most 
exalted judge or cleric. 
For the king, however, the sight of his subjects locked in struggle 
was reassuring. They looked to him to resolve their bickering, provid- 
ing living proof of the old proverb that he was the father of his 
people. The crown allowed some of these quarrels to continue for 
generations, but its procrastination was the result of more than just 
an exercise in divide and rule. Any firm decision was liable to produce 
at least one disappointed party, whose loyalty might then be in ques- 
tion. Delay, on the other hand, kept all sides on their best behaviour, 
for fear that a false move would prove fatal. 
In these corporate struggles, access to the king and members of his 
council was vital, either to assist a favourable verdict, or to block an 
unfavourable one. The church was in a particularly happy position, 
and could exert influence through the king's confessor, Court ser- 
mons, and the intervention of courtly prelates as well as via the 
official route of episcopal deputation. The parlements and provincial 
estates also enjoyed privileged access to the monarch, and by the later 
eighteenth century the presentation of remonstrances was an almost 
daily event. While even the most lowly corps or group of office- 
holders could petition the king, they could be less confident of receiv- 
ing a hearing. If they were not careful, their remonstrances would 
accumulate unread on the desks of the first clerk or masters of 
requests. To avoid that fate, they required the good offices of an 
intermediary, who could convey their message to a higher authority. 
Foremost amongst the power-brokers of the old regime were the 
provincial governors and intendants. With their ability to open the 
doors of ministers and even the king, they were an indispensable ally 
for an embattled corps. Others who might play a similar role were 
local bishops, or aristocrats, willing to plead their cause at Versailles. 
When two institutions from the same province were in conflict, 
Bibliotheque Nationale MS Fr 10435, fo. 34. 
potential power-brokers could expect to be contacted by both sides, if 
only out of a desire to neutralize their 'good offices'. The first clerk 
and the masters of requests, who controlled the flow of information 
to ministers and the royal council, were another coveted source of 
influence. Wherever possible, corps sent deputies to court in order to 
wait on these officials and to be on hand to forestall any ambushes 
prepared by their rivals. The more affluent amongst them sought to 
insure their position by keeping influential power brokers on a form 
of retainer. In addition to the sums traditionally dispensed on the 
governor, controller-general, and intendant, the estates of Burgundy 
petitioned successfully for the right to pay a pension of 3,000 livres to 
the first clerk, Mesnard de Conichard, in 1769. Less powerful institu- 
tions had to limit themselves to the occasional gift and regular dis- 
plays of deference in the hope of protecting their interests. As for the 
power-brokers, they had the satisfaction of seeing their place in the 
social and institutional hierarchy, the basis of their influence, 
reinforced. 
Approaching the powerful was not the only strategy pursued in the 
Darwinian world of old regime politics. During the Fronde the Paris- 
ian law courts had joined together in opposition to cardinal Mazarin, 
and the parlement of Paris threatened the government of Louis XV 
with the theory of a 'unity of classes' on several occasions after 1756. 
Yet when chancellor Maupeou implemented his dramatic remodel- 
ling of the judicial system in 1771, the parlements never dared to put 
their theory into practice. When their offices were threatened with 
additional taxation, the kingdom's bureaux of finances also explored 
the prospect of an association in 1774. This, and other similar pro- 
jects, came to naught because once such bodies went beyond a 
rhetorical expression of equality, they found themselves confronted 
by the imposing obstacles of particularism, privilege, and precedent. 
In the pays d'e'tats, friction between the provincial estates and the 
local parlement was a perennial feature of administrative life. Fiscal 
matters were especially controversial, and the parlements denounced 
what they perceived as abuse in the collection of taxation. Their 
protests were not always altruistic, and they would have liked nothing 
better than to act as the censors of local government. Brittany was the 
one exception to this conflictual picture, and after 1750 the provincial 
estates and the parlement of Rennes mounted joint opposition to 
taxation. This resistance was almost solely the work of the numerous 
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Breton nobility who dominated both institutions. Any noble who 
could prove that his family had belonged to the second order for at 
least loo years was eligible to sit in the estates. Hundreds took advan- 
tage of the privilege. By day, they gathered to denounce royal policy, 
while at night they expected to eat, drink, and make merry at the 
king's expense. As these sessions could continue for weeks, it is easy 
to understand the crown's subsequent frustration. The sheer number 
of nobles made it difficult to employ the traditional tactics of patron- 
age and bribery that were so successful in Burgundy or Languedoc. 
Moreover, as many of the Breton nobility were comparatively poor, 
they were especially sensitive to increases in direct taxation and they 
had the ideal platform from which to voice their discontent. 
If horizontal cooperation across corps was rare, it was far easier to 
achieve within a hierarchically ordered profession. During the reigns 
of both Louis XV and Louis XVI attempts to curb the powers of 
individual parlements through disciplinary edicts or exiles resulted in 
a complete cessation of the legal system within their jurisdiction. The 
parlements were capable of commanding obedience from the lawyers, 
advocates, and junior legal officers, whose actions were conditioned 
by a mixture of respect and self-interest. The judges were powerful 
men and their social rank and position inspired loyalty. Anyone 
tempted to break ranks, and that included those judges inclined to 
put duty to the king above esprit de corps, risked social ostracism and 
a premature end to their career. 
Old regime politics can appear an elite affair, and it is true that 
nobles and office-holders held centre stage. They were nevertheless 
eager to mobilize popular support. The most dramatic instance of 
this was provided during the Fronde, and, on one occasion, the first 
president of the parlement of Paris could inform the disbelieving 
regent, Anne of Austria, that '50,000 armed Parisians were ready to 
march at his side'.8 The genie of popular political activity, which came 
so close to being unleashed during the Fronde, was safely bottled for 
most of the next 150 years. Indeed one of the more remarkable 
features of the period is the relative absence of political violence. 
Driven to extremes by the policies of Richelieu and Mazarin, French 
elites, in both the towns and the countryside, had connived in popu- 
lar revolts, either by secretly encouraging them, or by refusing to use 
Le Boindre, Dtbats du parlement, 251. 
the forces of coercion at their disposal. Where revolts occurred after 
1661, notably in Brittany in 1675, they were repressed with severity. 
Louis XIV punished the parlement of Rennes for failing to uphold his 
authority with sufficient vigour, by transferring it to distant Vannes 
where it spent the next fifteen years. It was a clear lesson to others, but 
French elites had little reason to complain about their treatment. The 
king offered order on generous terms and most were grateful to 
accept. 
Displays of support for those engaged in conflict with the crown 
were therefore carefully choreographed. During the reign of Louis 
XV, the provincial parlements drew comfort from elaborate celebra- 
tions marking the end of their periodic quarrels with the crown. In a 
carnivalesque atmosphere, the various corps and guilds would parade 
in their finery to salute the judges. The streets were bedecked with 
flowers and banners, and lit in the evening to allow fireworks, music, 
dancing, banquets, and other distractions for the ordinary people. In 
1761, the townspeople of Besan~on were treated to the spectacle of a 
mechanically operated angel crowning the judges with laurels as they 
returned from exile. Two years later, their neighbours in Dijon wit- 
nessed a triumphal chariot, pulled by six black horses, and containing 
twenty-four local beauties, dressed as nymphs, who threw sweets to 
the crowds as they toured the city to bestow laurels on local judges 
after a battle with the provincial estates. 
These were very traditional expressions of communal solidarity 
designed to highlight and reinforce the social hierarchy. If they 
strengthened the hand of the parlements in their dealings with 
the crown, they never challenged the authority of the king directly. 
Victories were not won over the monarch himself, and the crowds 
that cried 'long live the lung, long live the parlement' were rejoicing 
at the re-establishment of a harmony disrupted by those shadowy 
figures who had temporarily 'deceived the king'. 
The public and its opinions 
Old regime politics was dominated by clientage and patronage, with 
corporate bodies struggling to maintain their status within a struc- 
ture still defined by the personal authority of the lung. Yet the impact 
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of cultural and economic change during the eighteenth century did 
produce a more politically conscious public, with the education, 
wealth, and leisure time needed to follow the military and diplomatic 
affairs of Europe and the religious and parlementary crises of France. 
It is true that the Fronde had produced an outpouring of political 
literature, most of it incredibly crude and hostile to the queen mother 
and Mazarin, but it was a brush fire whose blaze was as brief as it 
was intense. By the eighteenth century, the climate had altered 
profoundly. Not only was the total volume of political literature 
produced much greater, but it was also sustained over a far longer 
period and was accessible to a greater number of people. In addition 
to government newspapers and court circulars, the curious could 
peruse foreign periodicals, clandestine pamphlets and publications, 
notably the Jansenist Ecclesiastical News (Nouvelles eccle'siastiques), 
parlementary remonstrances (which were published despite an 
official ban), royal replies to those protests, handwritten broadsheets, 
and many other forms of literary ephemera. All told, it was a healthy 
diet to put before the public that gathered in the salons, academies, 
masonic lodges, reading rooms, coffee houses, and other places of 
sociability to read about or discuss current affairs. 
The monarchy had always been anxious to influence public opin- 
ion, as its elaborate ritual and visual propaganda made plain. For all 
his imperiousness, Louis XIV was even prepared to have an appeal 
for public support read from the pulpits in 1709, when the harsh 
peace terms offered by his enemies forced him to continue waging 
war. Defending the royal authority against the parlements and 
other critics in print, as his successors were obliged to do, was, 
however, more difficult because it allowed the reader to make a 
choice that was not necessarily favourable to the crown. Both con- 
temporaries and subsequent historians have thus described public 
opinion as a new tribunal that threatened to replace the king as the 
arbiter of conflicting political claims. 
There is no doubt that all sides were conscious that popular sup- 
port was a valuable weapon. On at least one occasion, the parlement 
of Paris was so determined to put its case to the public that it pub- 
lished its remonstrances, which was in itself illegal, before they were 
presented to the king! Ministers were no less adept, leaking informa- 
tion to the press and timing official announcements to maximum 
advantage. Policies required explanation, not only to those charged 
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with implementing them, but also to ordinary subjects. With the 
kingdom awash with print, an increasing quantity of which was far 
from deferential, the government's task was more onerous than ever 
before. In the aftermath of defeat in the Seven Years War, Louis XV 
went as far as to commission projects for the abolition of the corvke 
and the re-establishment of provincial estates in a bid to restore'pub- 
lic support. It says much about his disappointing reign that these 
imaginative plans never left the drawing board. 
Public opinion was not, however, the decisive factor in late 
eighteenth-century politics. Even today, despite the attention of 
armies of psephologists and well-heeled market researchers, it 
remains a fickle and elusive creature, and interpreting the effects of 
political literature on the eighteenth-century public is problematic. 
Before the reign of Louis XVI, appealing to the tribunal of public 
opinion, while common, did not necessarily achieve a great deal. It is 
difficult to cite a significant example of public sentiment radically 
altering royal policy, and although in 1709 Louis XIV sought to 
explain his actions, he would never have made peace because it was 
popular. A great deal of ink was spilt by the government of Louis XV 
justifying its declaration of war against Great Britain in 1756. Yet an 
outraged public reaction was not enough to persuade the king or his 
grandson to abandon the hugely unpopular Austrian alliance con- 
tracted in the same year. Finally, although opinion was overwhelm- 
ingly against chancellor Maupeou-whose allegedly despotic 
remodelling of the parlements in 1771 earned him the title of grand 
vizier-it was the death of Louis XV and not public hostility that 
brought about his fall. Like Mazarin before him, Maupeou seemed 
living proof that the confidence of his master, not public popularity, 
was the key to power in the old regime. Yet his dismissal by Louis XVI 
signalled a change: the new king was worried that to retain the chan- 
cellor would begin his reign on a note of unpopularity. When, eleven 
years later, he went so far as to consult his subjects in an assembly of 
Notables, the move was wittily remembered by the count de Skgur 
as the royal 'resignation'. 
Finally, it has been suggested that the highly contentious nature of 
political and religious debate in the eighteenth century began to filter 
down the social scale, touching those excluded from the still rarefied 
world of print. In 1757, the long-running religious and parlementary 
crises caused by Jansenism inspired a mentally confused domestic 
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servant, Robert-Fran~ois Damiens, to make an attempt on the life of 
Louis XV. As police spies trawled the kingdom for possible accom- 
plices, they discovered others praising Damiens and the more success- 
ful regicide, Cromwell, and, in the case of the military deserter Bellier 
de La Chauvellais, claiming that in the same circumstances he 'would 
have stuck his knife into the heart of the sacred b ~ g g t r ' . ~  Before 
Damiens struck, the marquis dYArgenson had recorded in his diary 
the appearance of regicidal placards in Paris, proclaiming, among 
other things, 'stir in yourselves the spirits of Ravaillac', a reference 
to Henri IV's notorious assassin. Disturbing as it was for Louis XV 
to attract such opprobrium, he could reassure himself that he was 
not the first to be so maligned. In 1709, the royal family had been 
serenaded with the insulting verse:'" 
Le grand ptre est un fanfaron, 
Le fils un imbecile 
Le petit-fils un grand poltron 
Ah! la Belle famille! 
Que je vous plains, peuples franqais 
Soumis A cet empire 
Faites ce qu'ont fait les anglais 
C'est assez vous le dire! 
Grandfather a braggart, 
The son a mere fool, 
The grandson a coward, 
Fine family rule! 
Unhappy French people, 
Subject to this sway, 
Just do like the English, 
No more need I say! 
Verbal abuse and insulting ditties, ballads, limericks, and other dog- 
gerel had long been directed at the monarch, his ministers, close 
family, and mistresses as well as at the elites of the kingdom by their 
social inferiors. The government was sensitive to this opinion, as its 
employment of an army of spies testified, but its direct political influ- 
ence was minimal. Instead, the popularity of the monarchy ebbed 
and flowed, and the despair and anger with Louis XIV in 1709 was 
replaced by a tide of public affection for his great-grandson. Louis XV 
squandered that resource, and by 1774 he had sunk low in public 
esteem. Yet the accession of Louis XVI transformed matters, and the 
young king was genuinely popular. His own tragic fall from grace 
came after 1789. 
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Conclusion 
If the ghost of Louis XIV had returned to haunt the corridors of 
Versailles during the 1780s, he would have found life much as he 
left it. Louis XVI reigned as an absolute monarch, holding council 
meetings as his forefather had done and ruling through the same 
apparatus of intendants and office-holders and the still ramshackle 
fiscal system that was about to bring the whole edifice crashing down. 
With hindsight, it is the relative weakness of the monarchy in the 
eighteenth century that is striking. Yet attempts at reform met with 
opposition because the subjects of Louis XV and Louis XVI feared 
that the famous intermediary powers would not be enough to pre- 
vent a strong government from degenerating into despotism. In his 
justly celebrated remonstrances delivered to the young Louis XVI on 
behalf of the Parisian court of aids, Lamoignon de Malesherbes 
declared: 'no one should dare to leave you in ignorance of the fact 
that the unanimous wish of the nation is to obtain either the Estates 
General or at least the provincial estates'." His bold and eloquent plea 
was a sign that well before 1789 the French were moving towards the 
conclusion that there could be neither taxation nor legitimate 
government without representation. 
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